Experimentation and Social Dialogue in the Transformation of the Italian Employment Law: from the Legalisation of Temporary Work to a Statute of the New Form of Employment? by Biagi, Marco & Tiraboschi, Michele
18 September 2017
intestazione repositorydell’ateneo
Experimentation and Social Dialogue in the Transformation of the Italian Employment Law: from the Legalisation of
Temporary Work to a Statute of the New Form of Employment? / Biagi, Marco; Tiraboschi, Michele. - STAMPA. -
35(1999), pp. 91-107.
Original
Experimentation and Social Dialogue in the Transformation of the Italian Employment Law: from the Legalisation of
Temporary Work to a Statute of the New Form of Employment?
Publisher:
Published
DOI:
Terms of use:
Altro tipo di accesso
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
Testo definito dall’ateneo relativo alle clausole di concessione d’uso
Availability:
This version is available at: 11380/1067544.15 since: 2017-09-01T11:21:54Z
Kluwer Law International
This is the peer reviewd version of the followng article:
  
 
 
 
 
Experimentation and Social Dialogue 
in the Transformation of the Italian Employment Law: 
from the Legalisation of Temporary Work 
to a Statute of the New Form of Employment?  
 
 
1. The New Legal Framework 
 
After a long period of relative stability – characterized by a progressive expansion of the 
legal statute on dependent work and by the consequent escape on the part of many 
from the regular framework of labour – Italian employment law has recently undergone 
a striking metamorphosis (see Biagi, 1998, Id., 1997). 
Act No. 196/1997 (the ‘Treu package’) has extended and strengthened the range of 
atypical forms of work: fixed-term contract, part-time work, temporary agency labour, 
apprenticeship, training contract and stages. Act No. 59/1997 (the ‘Bassanini Law’) and 
Decree No. 469/1997 have thoroughly redesigned the borders between the public and 
private areas in labour market management and employment services, eliminating the 
rigidity and inefficiency of the public monopoly on placement. Already firmly imple-
mented (or at least on the way to being fully defined) are the measures to support re-
search and technological innovation, financing of entrepreneurial development in de-
pressed areas or in areas of urban degradation, the reorganization of incentives for hir-
ing and geographical mobility, policies on the building of infrastructure through quali-
fied public investment and the reorganization of the professional training system, in 
particular, that of continuing training as an instrument to increase employability and the 
quality of labour supply. New instrument of huge importance in the development of 
certain local context – such as the ‘area contacts’ (contratti d’area) and ‘territorial pacts’ 
(patti territoriali) – are ready for their definitive emergence, while it is only now that we 
are beginning to appreciate the enormous impact and the future possibilities for the de-
velopment of an earlier reform: the privatization of public employment begun by De-
cree No. 29/1993 and implemented through the Decree No. 369/1997 and Decree No. 
80/1998 (on all of this, see, in general, Treu, 1998). 
                                            
These and still other interventions clearly indicate that labour law founded as a means 
of regulating one, unique model of dependent work (i.e., typical full-time contract for 
an indefinite period), now finds itself passed over not only by business – which has for 
a long time experimented (sometimes on the boundaries of legality) with new contrac-
tual methods of organising employment – but by the Italian legislator as well. Particu-
larly expressive of this state of affairs is the case of temporary agency labour. Business 
has long sought ways to work more efficiently within and around (see Tiraboschi, 1994) 
the very rigid framework that bound this form of work until the recent legalization of ar-
ticles 1-11 of Act No. 196/1997 (see Tiraboschi, 1997). 
 
 
2. A Glance Forward 
 
The reform process cannot stop here. We must admit that the transition from a mono-
lithic and rigid labour law (il diritto del lavoro) to a more comprehensive and dynamic 
one declined in the plural (il diritto dei lavori), which will take into consideration the 
evolving society and economy, has only just begun. 
Certain well-known and continually discussed phenomena – such as the globalization 
of market and technological innovation, coupled with the continuous growth of an an-
cient economic disease like black work and the proliferation of legal strategies designed 
to circumvent the rules of dependent work – have now gathered such undeniable mo-
mentum that we can now speak confidently of the necessity for a decisive updating of 
the Italian employment law. Paradoxically, the same statistical evidence about atypical 
and irregular work1
In particular, the conceptual opposition of contract of service and contract for services 
is becoming increasingly inadequate to the regulation of the evolution of the Italian la-
bour market. The jobs of the future require simple and flexible rules capable of dealing 
with uncertainties during the process of legal qualification, which is a tradition source 
of contention. 
 shows that what we have is not a lack of work, but rather a lack of 
legal rules and contractual schemes able to interpret these forms and develop them in 
such a way as to stimulate their emergence from illegally and their equal division be-
tween all those involved in the labour market. 
A typical characteristic of the Italian labour market is that the compression of the nu-
merous forms of work into the rigid scheme of contract of service and contract for ser-
vices pushes all the atypical forms of work into a large grey area very close to illegality. 
This occurs even when these forms of work are necessary for the survival of the busi-
ness or in the interest of the workers. 
In order to progress beyond this problematic and fragmented framework, it is necessary 
to experiment with new ways of forming labour law, as in the recent circular No. 
43/1998 from the Minster of labour, which recognized the legitimacy of contractual 
scheme such as job sharing. Until now this form of contract has never been experi-
mented with, due to fears about possible controversies regarding the exact legal de-
scription of this form of working relationship. (However, on this point, we should re-
member that the flexible organization of part-time working hours is still forbidden by 
                                            
1 In this context it is enough to point out that the Italian Institute for statistics (ISTAT) has recently shown 
that in Italy there are around 5 million irregular workers engaged in the underground economy, black or 
grey. This corresponds to about 23 percent of the Italian workforce. 
 the Italian labour law.) This circular demonstrated that it is not necessary to wait and 
wait, because of Parliamentary ‘working time’, to regulate a new way of working. In-
stead, in some cases, an administrative intervention clarifying the boundaries and the 
fundamental rules of the contract is sufficient.  
It should be pointed out that this does not mean the removal of the fundamental protec-
tion of labour law. But it does seem necessary to experiment with some doses of ‘regu-
lar flexibility (flessibilità normata) that, while contributing to the removal of some obsta-
cles to the functioning of the market for regular work, are helping to create a favourable 
climate for the creation of new employment and the channelling of supply and de-
mand, which today is dispersed and fragmented because of a lack of adequate informa-
tion and instruments to evaluate the workforce (see Treu, 1997). 
From this perspective, the recent legalization of temporary agency labour is extremely 
significant for the future development of Italian employment law. For this reason, it may 
be interesting to carry out a deeper and fuller evaluation of this particular form of atypi-
cal work, as it is particularly representative of the Italian labour climate.  
 
 
3. Experimentation and Social Dialogue in the Legalisation in Italy of Temporary 
Agency Labour 
 
It must immediately be pointed out that the recent legalization of temporary work 
through an agency cannot be interpreted simply as either a process of deregulation of 
the Italian labour market or as a new attitude of the Italian Government towards a dras-
tic reduction in labour standards. 
Taking into consideration the undoubted ineffectiveness of the official regulation of the 
public employment service and the conspicuous presence in the Italian labour market 
of a sprawling illegal network made up of private agencies and cooperatives of simple 
mediation, Act No. 196/1997 represents an attempt to re-regulate a sector that has re-
mained for too long outside the rules (Tiraboschi, 1997). The introduction of temporary 
agency labour into our legal system represents, in other words, a great opportunity to 
clarify once and for all the boundaries between secret mediation in the hiring of labour 
(still illegal in respect of Article 1, Act No. 1369/1960) and the genuine mediation justi-
fied by recent movements in the labour market and in the way of working. The objec-
tive of the Italian Government is to reshape some of the guidelines of labour law in the 
face of the ever-increasing constraints of economic compatibility.  
From this point of view it is relevant to underline the procedural technique adopted by 
the Italian legislator. The contents of Act No. 196/1997 reflect a previous agreement be-
tween the Government and the social parties (see the Employment Pact of 24 Septem-
ber 1996 and the previous Agreement of the Cost of Labour of 23 July 1993). The le-
galisation process follows a period of indispensible social legitimisation. In fact it has 
been demonstrated by comparatives experience; only social legitimisation can grant a 
stable juridical framework and real possibilities for the future development in this area 
(Compare, for example, the French case with the German one).  
Naturally, the will to capture social consensus has led to some (perhaps excessive) 
compromises and limitations. But it must be pointed out that this act is mainly experi-
mental: after two years of enforcement, Article 11 provides for a confrontation between 
the Government and the social parties in order to introduce, if necessary, corrections 
and integrations. 
In any case, the more contentious points are left to the process of collective bargaining, 
which will involve the social parties with the power to implement changes in the legal 
discipline. These important points include the delineation of cases in which it is possi-
ble to make use of a temporary worker, as well as the allowable ratio of temporary 
workers to the total number of workers of the user employee.  
 
 
3.1. Agencies Authorised to Supply Temporary Labour Services  
 
Article 2 of the Act lays down very strict regulations concerning those authorized to run 
a temporary agency. As in France, Germany and other European countries, the supply 
of labour cannot be provided freely by anyone who wishes to engage in this area. This 
is permitted only for ‘agencies’ specifically authorised by the Ministry of Labour. It is 
important to point out that the activity of supplying labour can be performed by a ‘legal 
entity’ and not by individuals. This legal entity must be a company registered in a spe-
cial list created at the Ministry of labour. 
The registration of these agencies is subjected to evidence that the applicant has me the 
specific requirements:  
• the legal form must be that of an enterprise/undertaking. (the nation of enter-
prise/undertaking includes also co-operative societies, but in this last case there are fur-
ther requirements which make it very difficult to use a co-operative for labour supply: 
see further). 
• included in the name of the enterprise must be the words ‘enterprise for the 
supply of temporary labour’. 
• start-up capital of not less than 1 billion Italian lire and, for the first years of ac-
tivity, a deposit guarantee of 700 million lire; from the third year, in place of the de-
posit, a bank or insurance guarantee for not less than 5 per cent of the previous year’s 
turnover and the net of VAT – with a total guarantee amount of not less than 700 mil-
lion Italian lire. 
• presence of the registered office or branch within the territory of the Italian 
State. 
• identification of the supply of temporary workers as the sole business – with the 
consideration that ‘mixed’ enterprises (performing both supply and placement of work-
ers) are less easily controlled and more subject to abuse and potential fraud. 
• availability of office and professional skills appropriate for the performance of 
the supplying labour. 
• guarantee that the activity will occur over the entirety of the national territory 
or, at least, over not less than four Regions. 
Special provision is also made concerning the personal qualification of directors, gen-
eral managers and mangers; most importantly, the absence of criminal convictions for 
the following: crimes against the patrimony, crimes against the public trust or against 
the public economy, the crime of association of a mafia-like character (under Article 
416-bis of the Penal Code), unpremeditated crimes for which the law provides the pen-
alty of imprisonment not less than three years at maximum, such as crimes or contra-
ventions provided for in laws aimed at the prevention of accidents at work or, more 
generally, laws on labour or social security. Those in question must also not be under 
criminal investigation or indictment.  
 Authorisation to supply temporary labour may also be granted to workers’ co-operative 
societies that, in addition to meeting the conditions required for the other companies, 
must have a least fifty members. In addition, it must employ non-partner employees for 
a number of days not exceeding one-third of the days of work performed by the co-
operative as a whole. In this case, however, not the work-partners but only the workers 
employed by the co-operative can be supplied by the co-operative as temporary labour. 
This provision is highly controversial, since it seems to stand in opposition to the gen-
eral principle governing workers’ co-operatives, namely that priority and preference in 
job opportunities should be given to partners as opposed to non-partners.  
Authorisation may also be issued to companies directly or indirectly controlled by the 
State, which have the aim of promoting and providing incentive for employment. So far 
(as of March 1998), 20 agencies more or less have been registered at the Ministry of 
Labour and are ready to operate.  
 
 
3.2. The Contract for the Supply of Temporary Workers 
 
The contract for the supply of temporary workers (contratto di fornitura di lavoro tem-
poraneo) is a commercial contract through which an agency authorized by the Ministry 
of Labour supplies one or more workers employed by it, either for a specific task or for 
an indeterminate period of time, to be at the disposition of a firm or a public admini-
stration – which uses these workers ‘to satisfy the need for temporary work’ (Art. 1).  
In the sense that it connects the three parties involved, this contract is the pivotal ele-
ment on which the entire trilateral legal scheme rests. It connects the parties directly by 
identifying the legal relations between the agency and the user, and indirectly through 
the mandatory specification of the kind of work, the duration, the remuneration and so 
on. This explains why, although it is a normal commercial contract, the Italian legisla-
tion has put a great deal of emphasis on its regulation. From the rules which govern it, 
and especially from the delineation of the rights, powers, obligations and responsibility 
existing between the agency and the user, is derived the concrete and effective protec-
tion of the worker.  
The supply of temporary workers is still forbidden: 
• for jobs of ‘low professional content’ – identified as such by the national collec-
tive agreement of the industry to which the client organization belongs, signed by the 
most ‘comparatively representative’ trade union organizations. 
• for the replacement of workers exercising the right to strike. 
• within production units in which during the previous twelve months there have 
been collective dismissals involving workers assigned to the tasks to which the tempo-
rary labour refers, save in the event the supply is to replace workers absent with the 
right to retain their job. 
• within the production units in which there has been a suspension of relation-
ship or a reduction in hours with the right to ‘wage integration’ (a kind of unemploy-
ment pay) involving workers employed performing the tasks to which the supply of 
temporary services relates. 
• to client organization failing to demonstrate to the Provincial Labour Office that 
they have carried out the risk assessment required by Italian law. 
• for process that require special medical surveillance and for particularly haz-
ardous work indentified by the decree of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is-
sued within sixty days of the coming into force of the present Act.  
Moreover, at the present time, in agriculture and building, temporary work supply con-
tracts can only be introduced experimentally, and following an agreement on the areas 
and models of experimentation between the employers’ organizations and the trade un-
ions ‘comparative representative’ at the national level.  
The law (Art. 1) provides that such a contract can be made: 
1) ‘in case of substitution for absent workers’. In comparison to Act No. 230/1962 
on fixed-term contracts, the possibility of using temporary agency labour to replace ab-
sent employees – even those who do not possess the right to retain their position – is 
certainly relevant. In fact, we must remind ourselves that under Act No. 230/1962 the 
use of temporary work in the form of a fixed-term contract was allowed only to substi-
tute for workers with the right to maintain their position. Taking into consideration, 
however, the collective agreement legitimised by Act No. 56/1987, we find that the 
possibility exists of entering into fixed-term contracts even to substitute for those absent 
without the right to maintain their position. The type of contract chosen in this case by 
the user can depend solely on financial motivations. Here the business must strike a 
balance between the lesser cost of fixed-term contracts and the relevant advantage 
gained in quality of service and highly skilled and well-developed workers through 
agency employment. 
2) ‘in case of temporary need for worker qualification not covered by the firm’s 
ordinary production organization’. It is important to emphasise that these rules are still 
an exception to Act 1369 of 23 October 1960 outlawing mediation in the hiring of la-
bour, a ban on labour-only subcontracting. Therefore, these cases must be interpreted 
in a restrictive sense. In particular, this second case does not seem to allow for the use 
of temporary agency labour in order to satisfy a boom in production that is not man-
ageable using the ordinary production organisation. Put in other terms, the concept of 
‘need for qualifications not covered by the firm’s ordinary production organization’ 
must be interpreted in an objective sense, rather refining to the skills and specialization 
which are present in the firm. This interpretation conforms to the philosophy behind the 
Act: temporary labour than through an agency cannot always be used as an alternative 
to regular employment, but rather constitutes a complementary instrument. For those 
reasons, one cannot agree with scholars who consider that the new institution will, hy-
pothetically, allow enterprises to under staff regular positions, filling the gaps with tem-
porary employees. From a judicial point of view, the high cost of temporary agency la-
bour renders this strategy of HRM irrational, not illegal.  
3) ‘in the cases provided for in the national collective agreement negotiated for the 
industry to which the client organization belongs, and signed by the most compara-
tively representative trade unions’. Attention should be paid to the new formula ‘com-
paratively representative union’, which reflects the intensifying problems of a number 
of unions coexisting in the same industry, all claiming to represent employees. This 
formula should empower the Government and local authorities to select that union 
that, in the context of a specific sector/branch, are more representative than others, rep-
resenting (not necessary organising) comparatively more workers than others. It seems 
very unlikely that this legal solution alone will be sufficient to solve the problem of un-
ion representation. One should add that it is necessary to develop appropriate legal 
 mechanisms to more adequately test, in effective terms, the power of trade union or-
ganizations to represent workers not officially affiliated with them. 
A recent national, multi-industry agreement signed by Confindustria, Cgil, Cisl and Uil 
states that the temporary work supply contract, regulated by Act No. 196, 24 June1997, 
may also be utilised – in addition to the case already included in Article 1, paragraph 2, 
letters b) and c) of the same act – to increase activity in the following cases: 
• peaks of more intense activity, which cannot be handled with the usual produc-
tion arrangements, and related to market demands coming from the acquisition of new 
orders, the launch of new products or on account of activities in other sectors. 
• a need for the accomplishment of specific tasks, services or contracting and 
subcontracting, limited and temporary pre-determined which cannot be accomplished 
using the usual production arrangement alone.  
• a need for the filling of particular orders that, because of the specific character 
of the product or the processing involved, required professional skills and specialization 
different from those normally used or that are, for whatever reason, in short supply on 
the local market.  
Temporary workers hired for those cases agreed upon by the social parties and outlined 
in (2) on previous page, are not allowed to total more than an average of 8% of the 
‘standard’ workers hired by the user enterprise. Otherwise, it is possible to sign con-
tracts for temporary work with a maximum of five people, provided their number does 
not exceed the number of open-ended contracts already signed by the enterprise.  
Skills of low professional content – for which, according to Article 1, paragraph 4, letter 
a) of Act No. 196/1997, it is forbidden to resort to temporary work – are those not in-
cluded among the ‘intermediate professional skills’ decided upon on 31Janaury 1995 
on the occasion of the national multi-industry agreement regarding working-training 
contracts and according to their specification laid down in the CCNL.  
A contract for the supply of temporary workers must be in written from, the worker who 
provides his /her work of the client organization is deemed to have been employed by 
the latter under an open-ended employment contract. Any clause intended to limit, 
even indirectly, the right of the client organization to continue to employ the worker at 
the end of the contract for temporary work is null and void. Further, a copy of the con-
tract for the supply of temporary workers must be sent within ten days of its signing by 
the supplying agency to the Provincial Labour Office responsible for the territory. 
 
 
3.3. The Contract between the Worker and the Agency 
 
The temporary agency labour contract is the contract by which the temporary employ-
ment agency employs the worker. The worker may be employed under a fixed-term 
contract, i.e., for a specified time corresponding to the duration of the work for the cli-
ent organization. The worker may also, at the discretion of the temporary agency, be 
employed under an open-ended contract, i.e., for an indeterminate time.  
Once employed, the temporary worker is required to carry out his/her activities in the 
interest and under the direction and control of the client organization. It is worth noting 
that the exercise of disciplinary power still belongs to the agency, on the assumption 
that the employment relationship is established between the agency and worker. Never-
theless, Act 196/1997 provides that the client/ user company shall report to the agency 
for possible disciplinary action any possible violation of work duties (as identified by 
the client) by the worker. Commentators have emphasised that this solution seems 
rather complicated, although it is a consequence of the ‘triangular’ arrangement charac-
teristic of temporary agency labour.  
In the case of employment for an indeterminate period, the worker remains at the dis-
posal of the agency even during periods in which he/she is not working for a client or-
ganization. In this case, the contract between the employee and the agency shall make 
provision for a guaranteed income for periods in which no work is performed (‘avail-
ability bonus’). 
As far as the application of statutory and collectively agreed-upon employment protec-
tion standards is concerned, the temporary agency workers are not considered part of 
the workforce of the client/user firm. This rule does not refer to health and safety provi-
sions.  
The temporary employment contract must be in written form, and a copy must be given 
to the worker within five days of the beginning of activity within the client organization. 
In the absence of a written contract or indication of the beginning and end of the work 
at the client organization, the contract for temporary employment is converted into a 
contract binding the agency for an open-ended period. However, the expressed period 
of the initial assignment may be extended, with the consent of the worker and in writ-
ing, and for the duration provided for in the national collective agreements covering the 
category.  
If the work continues beyond the specified time, the worker is after that time, deemed 
to have been employed on an open-ended basis by the client organization. Thus, if the 
temporary work continues beyond the term initially set or is subsequently extended; the 
worker has the right to an increase of 20% in daily pay for each day of the continuation 
of the relationship, until the tenth day following. This increase is chargeable to the 
agency if the continuation of work has been agreed upon. 
Temporary workers must be employed under the same pay, conditions and other terms 
to which employees at the same level of the client organization are entitled. A principle 
of parity between permanent and temporary workers is established in the legislation of 
many European countries. However, the collective agreements of the industry to which 
the client organization belongs can identify – in relation to the results achieved in im-
plementing programs agreed upon by the parties or linked with the economic results of 
the organization – modalities and criteria for the determination and payment of wage 
and salaries.  
 
 
4. The Legal Status of Temporary Workers 
 
The great difficulties in providing effective protection of the individual and collective 
rights of the groups involved in the supply of temporary work have all along drastically 
slowed the process of legislation. Undoubtedly these difficulties stem from, more than 
merely the temporary and intermittent nature of the labour, the structural and pro-
grammatic separation between the (holder of the) contract and (the real user in) the 
working relationship. In fact, for the temporary, worker, an employment contract in-
volving even two potential employers (the agency and the client employer), can result 
in a contract with ‘no stated, effective employer’ (Siau, 1996, p. 16) or, at any rate, no 
visible control over the power and responsibilities connected to the use of a hetero-
direct workforce. 
 A particular illustrative example can be taken from the British experience. The deep 
uncertainties shown by the judiciary in regard to the legal qualification of the contract 
between the intermittent worker and the temporary agency, together with the difficulty 
of integrating the requirement of continuing seniority required by the British legislation, 
have, for the majority of this kind of worker, made the regulations arranged by labour 
law to protect dependent employment relationships in essence irrelevant. The danger is 
not wholly theoretical that, in this as in other similar cases, the worker could be de-
moted ‘from subject of rights to transitory object’ (Ghezzi, 1995, p. 229). 
In order to confront the danger of masking the true relationships of production and con-
sequently, the true bearer(s) of responsibility for workers’ rights, the legislature has in-
troduced a series of stricture that are intended to guarantee, although only in an indirect 
way, the right of temporary workers: rigorous selection of subjects qualified for the sup-
ply of temporary work (Art. 2); delimitation of legitimate cases for resources to supply of 
temporary work and further reference to the provisions of Act No. 1369/1960, which 
still represent the general rule with respect to the legal qualification of the interposing 
phenomena (Arts. 1 and 10); clear and unequivocal outlining of the responsibilities and 
obligations of the dispatcher and dispatched worker with respect to the protection of 
the health and safety of temporary workers (Art. 6.1), social security benefits and con-
tributions and welfare services (Art. 9, 1), damages caused to third parties by temporary 
workers during working hours (Art. 6, 7), accident and professional disease insurance 
(Art. 9, 2), etc. 
At this point it is necessary to add that to these ‘indirect’ guarantees – normally used to 
safeguard steady work and full-time employment – Act No. 196/1997 adds some im-
portant provisions for the ‘direct’ protection of individual and collective temporary 
worker’s rights. These provisions can be constructed as a movement towards a fully-
fledged ‘statute’ concerning temporary workers. Because the employee must in actual-
ity (though not legally) interact with two employers, an abstract assimilation of the tem-
porary worker’s rights with those of all workers already heard, whether with standard or 
atypical contracts, is hardly effective. What is instead required is a precise individual-
ism (if possible, through a collective agreement for temporary agency employees: cfr. 
Art. 11, 5) of the active and passive legal positions of the worker, both within the sup-
plier agency and user enterprise.  
From this point of view, a fundamental parameter with respect to the goal of adjusting 
the general regulations to the peculiarities of this case must surely be the application of 
the principle of equal treatment, or non-discrimination, between permanent workers of 
the user enterprise and temporary workers.  
If, with respect to the relationship between the temporary agency and the user enter-
prise, the principle of equal treatment enables us to reduce or even exclude the specu-
lative character of the legal nature of that relationship (Art. 3, Act No.1365/1960), it 
seems in fact to guarantee, on the level of the single worker’s legal position, a good so-
cial integration of the worker into the user enterprise. Concerning collective relation-
ships, the principle of equal treatment allows the coincidence of the intermittent work-
force’s interest with the permanent personnel, either of the temporary agency or the 
user enterprise. This side steps the dangerous phenomena of both social dumping and a 
direct opposition of interests between the different groups of workers in a given labour 
context.  
For these reasons, in spite of the rubric of Article 4 (which simply refers to the retribu-
tive treatment of the temporary workers), it seems reasonable to assume that by ‘equal 
treatment’ is meant not only the economic variety, but the normative as well. On this 
issue the social parties have expressed themselves in the Agreements of 1993 and 1996, 
both of which provide for – as is made evident by the accompanying report of Bill No. 
1918/1996 – ‘conditions of full parity with the employees of the user company’. Article 
4, paragraph 2 states that the worker temporarily assigned to a user enterprise must be 
‘given treatment not inferior to that which the employees at the same level of the user 
enterprise are entitled to receive’ (emphasis added), without any exclusive referral to 
remuneration, while Article 1, paragraph 5, c) Article 3, paragraph 3, f) point out that, 
in both user contract and the agency contract, the place, the working hours ‘and the 
economic and normative treatment’ of the workers shall be equal.  
This regulation could, on a practical level, give rise to several problems, above all with 
reference to non-homogeneous level of working arrangements between the supplier 
and the user. Even more relevant is the problem of the comparison between the jobs 
performed by the temporary worker and the way in which wage levels are determined 
within the user enterprise. Such a comparison would not always be possible, when one 
considers that one of the cases of legitimate resort to temporary workers is one involv-
ing the temporary needs for skill not provided for the normal arrangements. 
In the case of an open-ended contract, the temporary agency must provide for monthly 
‘availability’ compensation divisible into hourly portions, payable by the supplier en-
terprise during the periods in which the worker is waiting for the assignment (Art. 4, 3). 
The aforesaid compensation must conform with the level laid down in the collective 
agreement and, furthermore, not be inferior to the minimum fixed by Decree of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security; in the case of part-time work, the level is re-
duced proportionally. It is important to note that the availability compensation is de-
scribed as a type of minimal remuneration due to the worker being hired with an open-
ended contract. If, as is the case with short period of assignment, the remuneration re-
ceived for the work effectively carried out in the user enterprise does not reach the in-
demnity level, the supplier enterprise is in fact obliged to augment the remuneration 
until it equals the level of availability compensation. 
Within the structure of the act, it is of particular importance to consider the provision of 
Article 3, paragraph 4 – according to which the worker ‘has the right to supply his la-
bour for the whole period of assignment, except in the case of not advancing beyond 
the trail period or the unexpected occurrence of a just cause of not withdrawal from the 
contract’ (emphasis ended). In fact, in one way, the right to supply labour for the entire 
period of the assignment represents a protection against possible discriminatory prac-
tices. It is, however, easy to imagine how, with its practical application, the effective-
ness of this provision will be greatly weakened by the reciprocal relationships of power 
and economic convenience between worker and agency on one side, and those be-
tween the agency and the user enterprise on the other side. The fear of missing future 
possibilities for work will push the agency as much as the worker not to insist upon 
such demands. In another way, this provision allows one to sustain that proof as to a 
just cause for withdrawal should be evaluated in the light of that withdrawal’s accruing 
only to the interests of the user enterprise, rather than that of the supplier or worker. 
For these reasons, it does not seem correct to state that Article 3, paragraph 4 regulates 
only the just withdrawal from the contract for fixed-term temporary work, with open-
ended contracts being referred to the general legislation on dismissals. The just cause 
for withdrawal dealt with Article 3, paragraph 4 must in fact be referred to dysfunctions 
affecting the contract for the supply of temporary work and therefore, primarily, to the 
 relationship between the supplier and the user enterprise. If not, it could be paradoxi-
cally maintained that the temporary worker employed with an open-ended contract is 
entitled to complete his assignment even in the pre-sense of the justified reason (subjec-
tive or objective) for dismissal, given that, in these cases, a just cause for withdrawal 
from the employment contract might be lacking. Similarly, the temporary worker even 
if hired with an open-ended contract, should then be allowed to withdraw freely from 
the employment relationship by giving his/her resignation during the trial period, even 
though he/she has received available compensation during the waiting period before 
assignment.  
The application of a cause for legitimate cancellation of a contract for the supply of 
temporary work will obviously also have an effect on the temporary work contract. The 
failure of the broader connection, upon which temporary agency labour is based, will 
directly imply the cancellation of the fixed-term temporary work contract, which is 
used specifically on the basis of beneficial length of labour period. There will, however, 
exist greater problems with determining the future of an open-ended temporary work 
contract – and, unfortunately, in this case complex logical and systematic confusion ex-
ist concerning the possible application of the general legislation of Act No. 604/1966 
and its pursuant changes and riders to the temporary work contract. 
This issue undoubtedly deserves an attentive analysis (with reference also to the prob-
lems connected with the exertion of disciplinary power). Although such an analysis 
cannot be carried out within these preliminary reflections on Article 1-11 of Art No. 
196/1997, it could be supposed, from now on wards, that the general legislation con-
cerning dismissal is also structurally unrelated to the open-ended temporary work con-
tract. Firstly, because it deals with a form of negotiation not pertaining to Article 2094 
of the Civil Code and, secondly, because the withdrawal preceded by a warning seems 
hardly compatible with the assignment period of the worker.  
The question deserves, as we have already said, more attentive consideration also be-
cause the position, mentioned above in purely problematic terms, seems at the moment 
to be a minority opinion. However, with respect to the open-ended temporary work 
contract, only two cases for cancellation seem plausible, both referring to a just cause 
for withdrawal from the employment contract: on the one hand, the interruption of the 
assignment with the user company on account of a just withdrawal from the supply 
contract that also affects (although not automatically, as in the fixed-term employment 
contract) the temporary contract, and the groundless refusal of the worker to accept the 
execution of an assignment, on the other hand. If these considerations are indeed well 
founded, one could consequently conclude that there exists no other possibility, aside 
from dismissal or resignation for a just cause, for the just withdrawal from the tempo-
rary work contract. However, it is not clear what legal interests a temporary agency 
would have in paying a fixed-term worker availability compensation should be the lat-
ter, having accepted an assignment, then be free to determine, through giving simple 
notice, the cessation of the obligation.  
From this point of view, particular importance will be attached to the collective agree-
ment for employees of the temporary agency (cfr. Art. paragraph 5). This agreement will 
regulate the procedure of withdrawal with notice (during periods before assignment) for 
the worker hired under an open-ended contract and outline the just reasons, regardless 
of the type of contract, for withdrawal during the temporary worker’s periods of as-
signments. In fact, this seems to be the only possible way – at least if we are concerned 
with not excluding completely the temporary agencies’ interests (already reasonably 
limited) – to draw up open-ended temporary work employment contract. Thinking dif-
ferently, the exclusion of the general legislation on dismissals will flow de facto from 
the economic choices made by the supplier enterprises; that is they will most likely 
limit themselves to fixed-term contracts with temporary workers, thus excluding the 
possibility that these workers can benefit from a minimum income between assign-
ments. (This is now the case in Germany, where – in the absence of the obligation to 
hire temporary workers with an open-ended contract – current practice shows a net 
predominance of unstable and temporary contractual relations.) 
Article 5 of Act No. 196/199, on the professional training of temporary workers, is 
aimed at weakening, if not entirely excluding, the undeniable risks involved in the ‘pre-
cariousness’ inherent in temporary work. This article should be put alongside both the 
1996 labour Agreement and the general perspective on the reorganisation of profes-
sional training outlined in Article 17 of Act No. 196/1997. Article 5 sets up a fund 
aimed at financing temporary worker’s professional training and supported by the sup-
plier enterprises with contributions equal to 5% of the remuneration paid to these 
workers. This fund will, moreover, have the option to assign resources – should they be 
stipulated in collective agreements applying to the supplier enterprises – to support 
workers’ income ‘during periods of works shortage’ (Article 5, paragraph 4). The activa-
tion of this provision is dependent upon the issuing of a decree promulgation within 
sixty days of the date on which the law will come into force. At the present time, it can 
only be assumed that training will take place during the periods between assignments 
(see Vittore, Landi, 1997).  
With specific regard to professional training as an ‘antidote’ to precariousness in em-
ployment relationships, one must straight away reaffirm the presence of the confusions, 
mentioned above, relating to the exclusion from the purview of the act in question 
those skills of low professional content. It is surely paradoxical that those workers with 
high professional skills – already excluded from the ordinary labour market and there-
fore relegated to the hidden one – will not be able to benefit from the professional train-
ing initiatives that can supposedly contribute to an elevation out of their precarious 
state (Veneziani, 1993, Treu, 1995). 
Furthermore, the training provision also raises uncertainties from the point of view of 
the user enterprise, since put in the general context of Article 1-11 of Act No. 
196/1997; it does not seem to provide any guarantee of competitive advantage based 
on the ‘quality’ of human resources. In fact, temporary worker training, as it is presently 
organized, presents itself as a purely coercive measure that does not nourish a corre-
sponding interest of the temporary agency for the professional elevation and specializa-
tion of its own employees. Also, we should not forget all those clauses intended to limit 
the ability of the user enterprise to hire the worker at the end of the contracts for the 
supply of temporary labour (Act. 1, paragraph 6 and Art. 3, paragraph 6). Even if this 
provision is justified with respect to temporary work employment contracts of limited 
duration, it seems unreasonable if applied to temporary work employment contracts for 
an indeterminate time. Paradoxically, a provision supposedly in favour of temporary 
workers ends up working against them, since it discourages the constitution of stable 
relations between user company and workers. 
Comparative examples are highly instructive in this case. The legislation of both the 
Spanish and the Japanese is indifferent toward whether supplier enterprises enter into 
fixed-term or open-ended employment relationships with their own temporary workers. 
In practice, while the Spanish temporary agencies immediately moved towards fixed-
 term contracts, Japanese agencies, because they place more stress on training and in-
vestment in human resources, do not hesitate to hire the large majority of temporary 
workers for an indeterminate time (more than 80%) (cfr. Tiraboschi, 1995). It is easy to 
foresee that, since provisions to sustain employment for an indeterminate time are miss-
ing, Italian agencies will orient themselves, as the Spanish, towards the fixed-term con-
tracts. 
Should this prove to be the case, it will then be particularly difficult to assign the role of 
a link between assignments to the temporary worker’s professional training and the lack 
of judicial stability in the labour relationship with the temporary agency will probably 
make the process of training a workforce causal and irregular by nature, both complex 
and fragmentary.  
Lastly, we see that an analysis of the temporary workers’ union rights reveals a notable 
distinction between the relationship of the worker with temporary agency and that with 
user enterprise. 
With reference to the forms of representation of temporary workers with in the tempo-
rary agency, there are few regulations which define an ad hoc rule or provide for an 
adaptation of the general rules with respect to the relevant peculiarities of this case. 
This has the result – largely taken for granted – of making the temporary worker’s pri-
mary channel of representation completely abstract and secondary. The wording 
adopted by the Italian legislature concerning this point is quite reductive: ‘… union 
rights shall be applied to the user enterprises’ employees as stated in Act No. 300, 20 
May 1970 and the modifications pursuant thereon’ (Art. 7 paragraph 1). Not only is 
there no co-ordination between the forms of representation of the temporary agency’s 
permanent workers and the temporary workers (for example, the use of a mechanism of 
polls division with respect to the creation of an RSA) and, within this last category, be-
tween workers hired with a fixed-term contact and workers hired with an open-ended 
contact. There are, in addition, not even minimal directives on the manner in which a 
workforce that is, by definition, temporary and fluctuating should be calculated. The 
fact is that in the Italian regulations there exists no consideration of the way to bring 
about a concrete enjoyment union rights (both active and passive) within the different 
forms of labour and the phenomenon, typical of manpower supply, of the fragmenta-
tion and dispersal of the enterprise collective. The risk is that the important principle af-
firmed in Article 7, paragraph 1 will remain a dead letter. 
Of course, the problem of counting the temporary agency’s employees emerges in ref-
erence to the field of enforcement of the Workers’ Statute. Taking into consideration the 
formulation of Act No. 196/1997, it seems beyond dispute that the requisites of Article 
35 of the Statute can be applied to the temporary agency’s employees as well. 
Regarding the union rights of temporary workers assigned to a user enterprise, Article 7, 
paragraph 3 of Act No. 196/1997 does not hesitate to affirm that ‘the temporary worker, 
for the entire length of his/her contract, has the right from the user enterprise to exercise 
the rights to freedom and to union activity, and even to participate in the assemblies of 
the user enterprises’ employees’. If, however, one attempts a co-ordination of the for-
mal provision of the act within a union practices, it becomes apparent that in this case 
as well as the acknowledgment of some of the rights of the temporary worker runs the 
risk of being merely theoretical. 
In attempting a solution to this problem we can take our bearings from a comparative 
evaluation of the general provisions concerning temporary workers’ rights included in 
the national multi-industry Agreement of 20 December 1993 – an agreement concern-
ing the creation of unitary union structures- from which it is possible to infer that only 
rarely does a temporary worker satisfy the requirements necessary to remain in the en-
terprise. With particular reference to the delicate theme of the right to stand as a candi-
date, we find that the industry-level collective bargaining taking place after the Agree-
ment, even though the exact formulation sometimes differ, has effectuated the provi-
sions of the latter. In C.c. No. 1, in fact, the eligibility of workers with a fixed-term con-
tract, or rather of those with a non-open-ended contract, is provided for and, therefore, 
also that of temporary worker, at least theoretically. But this is dependent on the condi-
tion that the worker’s contract is, on the date of the elections, still valid for a period not 
less than six months. The right to stand as candidate is therefore not applicable to those 
workers hired with a contract of less than six months. In addition, there is no provision 
made for the disparity between the temporary nature and the uncertainty of the labour 
relationship and the three-year office of the RSU member. Thus, at the end of the non-
open-ended contract, the mandate expires automatically. However, even if one were to 
assert that these rules are not applicable by analogy to the temporary labour force, it is 
at any rate that Italian union procedures have shown complete indifference towards the 
mechanisms of representation of the labour force present inside a company on a merely 
temporary basis (cfr. Tiraboschi M., 1996). It is thus apparent that that these restrictions 
will lead to the exclusion for the temporary worker of both the right to vote and the 
right to stand as a candidate, on the presupposition that he/she has no real contractual 
ties with the user enterprise. 
And yet, despite some obvious difficulties, it does not seem that the status of a tempo-
rary worker is radically incompatible with the right to vote. On a systematic level, it 
must at least be recognized that the temporary worker has the right to participate in the 
elections of the representative for worker safety, according to Article 18 of Legislative 
Decree No. 626/1994, which states that ‘the representative for safety is elected directly 
by the workers and chosen from among them’. 
However, it must be emphasized that union rights, according to Article 7 of Act No. 
196/1997, seem to take on a significant degree of efficacy only when referred to the 
collective interests of the stable labour force of the use of enterprise. In fact, Article 7, 
paragraph 4 instructs the user enterprise to communicate, before the initiation of the 
supply contract, to the unitary union structure, or to plant-level union structure (and, in 
the absence of such, to the territorial trade association connected to the most represen-
tative national confederation) the numbers of and reasons for resource to temporary 
workers and continue to provide this information, along with a description of the con-
tacts and workers involved.  
As we have already seen at a previous session (Tiraboschi M., 1996), in order to resolve 
the delicate problems of the representation of the collective interests of the temporary 
workforce, notwithstanding that this leads to tension and antagonism with the steady 
one, it is no longer possible to set aside this problem of ‘participation’. In fact, in the 
face of the ‘evolution that (…) the labour factor is undergoing, on the level of contents 
and the way of execution (and also of the same contractual typologies that can be 
used)’, one cannot but agree with one who presses for a corresponding process of 
change and adaptation within union activity, in the exercising of its protective function 
for workers’ interests (…) and the opening towards participation models’ (on this points 
see Carabelli, 1996). With this reference to temporary labour through an agency, the 
search for adequate channels of communication between the individual and the collec-
tive level cannot be limited to traditional outlines of the exercise of union rights or 
 workers access to the functions of representation inside the company. We must go far 
beyond in our search for and experimentation with new forms of representation conso-
nant with emergence of these, so to speak, ‘disorganised’ interests.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Undoubtedly, the technique adopted by Act No. 196/1997 for the regulation of tempo-
rary agency labour represents a substantial starting point for more complete reform in 
Italian labour law and good start toward providing clear regulation on atypical work in 
general.  
Given the specific legal and cultural context of Italy, a simple deregulation is not feasi-
ble. On the contrary, it seems necessary to experiment with, as we have said, doses of 
‘regulated flexibility’, contributing to the creation of a climate favouring additional em-
ployment and the recovery of the broad areas of black work. The government is indeed 
committed, as has been formally affirmed in the agreements with the social parties, to 
loosening some of Italian labour law’s real rigidities, but without destructing the market 
of steady and full-time labour. Within this broad context, characterized by particular 
bonds of economic and social compatibility, the inevitable problem of the redefinition 
of the boundaries between independent and dependent work cannot be simplistically – 
and unrealistically – approached through an intervention directed towards burdening 
penalising atypical work, co-ordinated activities and the new forms of work organiza-
tion. A legislative intervention in the form of the codification of a new bargaining 
scheme (co-ordinated work) does not promise to be helpful either. The market requires 
flexibility, simple rules, and certainty of the law: a new definition introducing a con-
tractual terbium genus could only decrease the litigation, uncertainties of description 
and the escape into the black economy. 
More convincing and realistic is the idea of a Statute of the new forms of employment 
that would approach in a pragmatic manner the problem of the new forms of employ-
ment more from the side of protection (and of their re-modulation as regards all em-
ployment relationships), than from that of formal definitions and concepts. The idea that 
should be developed implies the abandonment of the never-ending attempt to define 
and classify a contractual reality that changes rapidly and constantly and in its place, 
the creation of an essential (and appropriately limited) core of imperative rules and 
principles – mainly those referred to in the Constitution common to all bargaining rela-
tionships concerning labour.  
In brief, the Statute should operate on two separate levels constructed to support each 
other. On one side we could conceive of a voluntary mean, stimulating certification in 
the administrative setting, of the legal qualification assigned by the parties to a specific 
labour relationship. On the other hand, in order to render such a mean effective, it will 
be necessary to move towards the removal of some of the causes that combine to add 
to the litigation concerning employment relationships and raise levels of physiological 
flight into the black and the atypical labour markets. (Of course, a very different thing is 
the pathological flight, which, in addition to eroding labour guarantees, is also an ele-
ment of distortion in the arena of competition and must be done away with.) This could 
be accomplished by outlining a new way of reducing the differences between inde-
pendent and dependent employment relationships. In this perspective, a Statute on the 
forms of employment could make it possible to modulate and heighten (by type) the 
protections germane to every kind of agreement, setting up a concentric pattern of 
categories along a continuum of modalities in the execution of labour, moving from the 
minimum and imperative protections enforceable in all employment relationships, to 
the grantees belonging only to dependent work (protection against dismissal). 
The issue of employment relationship certification, as an answer to the excess of court 
cases on the subject of contract classification, will not necessary mean a marked in-
crease in conflicts, on the condition, obviously, that the bargaining programme agreed 
upon ex ante by the parties is kept during the term of adjustment. In order to foster the 
process of certification, it would be also useful to distinguish between an area of an ab-
solutely binding nature or public order (in other words, an area related to the worker’s 
fundamental rights), which would not be at the parties disposal (under penalty of rela-
tionship reclassification in judicial session) and an area of relative changeability, nego-
tiated by the collective partners during collective bargaining and/or by the individual 
partners as the employment relationship is established. In this last case, however, this 
could take place only in front of the administrative body qualified for such certification 
(wages above the minimum sufficiency threshold, management of career paths, length 
of notice, relationship stability, and allowance in case of relationship suspension, work-
ing times, etc.). 
Undoubtedly more critical is the element concerning the remodulation of protection, 
on which not only can adequate political and social consent hardly be realized, but, 
surprisingly, concerning which taboos and ideological disagreements re-emerge. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that the regulation of atypical work requires the revision (at least in 
part) of the traditional dependent work protections as well, and we must also proceed 
toward a corresponding normative realignment of social security benefit, which will en-
tail the outlining of a core of social security common to all independent and dependent 
workers. This would in turn entail provisions for basic social-insurance tax revenue for 
all employment relationships, contributing toward making the problem of the qualifica-
tion of the various types of social security less drastic. The mere regulation of atypical 
work without a corresponding redefinition of the dependent work statute is, as a matter 
of fact, incapable of anything but a contribution to making labour management rules 
more burdensome and presumably stimulating further flight into the hidden economy 
or even an increase in labour outsourcing and enterprise reallocation.  
It is clear that a serious reform bill cannot avoid this issue. In light of a normative and 
social framework that already provides for ample forms of evasion of the employment 
stability rule, it is quite frankly puzzling to witness the rigidly ideological requirements 
trumpeted by some political and trade union groups concerning the question of dis-
missals. In addition to the black and grey labour markets, there is nobody who can 
deny that nowadays entrance into the dependent labour market, take place, for the 
most part, through the legitimate expedients of forms temporary work, fictitious training 
contracts (apprenticeship, work-training contract) and independent and co-ordinated 
work contracts. Regarding all of these, the rules concerning dismissals are not enforced. 
Why should we accept this hypocrisy, unless it is to handle with kid gloves the politi-
cally charged issue of firings, instead of working seriously towards a real solution aimed 
at the effective reinitiating of the open-ended labour contracts and youth employment? 
What we are lacking here is certainly no ideas: except for the prohibition against dis-
criminatory dismissals (e.g., for illness or maternity), the enforcement of the narrow 
limitations on individual discharges could be jettisoned (without impairing the protec-
tions of an adult labour force firmly inserted in a business context) for the following: a) 
 those working their first job ( and under 32 years of age) with an open-ended depend-
ent employment contract; b) for all new hires, during their first two years of work, in the 
provinces in which the average yearly rate of unemployment for the year before hiring, 
according to the enlarge ISTAT definition, is at least 3% lower than the national aver-
age; c) for those workers who have seniority of less than two years with the same em-
ployer. 
We repeat again that the deficit is not in good idea, but in the ability (the courage?) to 
abandon old schemes hardened paradigms that no longer correspond to the reality on 
which we would like to improve (on this point see Blanpain, 1998). 
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